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Abstract 
The investment and export-driven economic model followed by Chinese governments after 
1978 served very well their catching-up vision, but China’s unprecedented race to the top had its 
flaws and drawbacks, leading to negative externalities and multiple structural imbalances. The global 
economic crisis and the interventionist package implemented to countervail its impact triggered a host 
of unwanted, negative outcomes which further aggravated the imbalances of the Chinese economy and 
created some new ones. It therefore became more obvious than ever that the old economic model had 
reached its limits and it needed to be changed. This task rests with the new cabinet led by premier Li 
Keqiang who launched a blueprint of bold reforms, but their implementation will presumably meet the 
strong opposition of powerful vested interests. The paper looks at the structural imbalances of the 
Chinese economy, highlighting the needed rebalancing processes. It also looks at the reform blueprint 
designed  by  the  new  leadership,  disclosing  and  discussing  some  of  its  main  implementation 
challenges. 
Keywords:  China,  development  model,  structural  imbalances,  economic  rebalancing, 
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1. Introduction 
China is now at a crucial stage of its transformation, with its old and successful economic 
model having reached its limits and having generated critical negative externalities and structural 
imbalances. Thus, the need for a new model, resting primarily on domestic demand and focussed on 
innovation and quality, becomes an imperative. This is a complex and challenging endeavour, trying 
the government’s ability to avoid the middle income trap, steer China to sustainable growth and make 
it a member of the highly developed economies elite. It is a vital challenge for China, but also for all 
the other actors on the global stage, as this country’s status and positioning in the world economy 
makes its every move important by its consequences for each and every member of our globalized 
world.  
2. The Chinese economic model - from the “miracle of rapid growth” to 
“running out of steam”  
The investment and export-driven economic model followed by Chinese governments served 
very well their catching-up vision. For over three decades China managed a nearly 10% average 57 
 
growth rate, becoming the second largest economy in the world, the number one industrial producer, 
the first exporter, the second importer and the holder of the largest foreign exchange reserve globally, 
while  Chinese  companies  and  banks  took  top  positions  in  many  global  markets  and  in  various 
international rankings. 
China managed an impressive industrialization, urbanization and modernization process, it 
largely  diversified  its  industrial  set-up,  it  developed  powerful  cities,  with  bold  architecture, 
interconnected by extensive and good quality infrastructure. It created yearly tens of million jobs and 
it pulled out of poverty some hundreds of million people, it increased life expectancy and the living 
standards at home and it became an engine of growth for both Asia and the world. No other country 
has ever managed such a performance in terms of high growth rates, for such a long period of time, 
with such impressive results, but… 
This unprecedented race to the top also had its flaws and drawbacks, leading to negative 
externalities and multiple structural imbalances. The main weakness of the model lays in its flawed 
resource allocation, with excessive investment (and the resulting overcapacities) in resource-intensive 
industries  and  in  infrastructure,  on  the  one  hand,  and  frugal  domestic  consumption,  weak  public 
services and underdeveloped social protection, on the other. Also, the model encouraged excessive 
investments  in  capital,  natural  resources  and  energy-intensive  industries  which  produced  huge 
pollution, damaging badly the environment, in parallel with the underdevelopment of innovation and 
knowledge-intensive industries and services. At the same time, resource allocation in China displayed 
an  excessive  bias  for  the  -  often  inefficient  –  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs),  which  enjoyed 
favourable access to cheap financing, various exemptions and low accountability, strengthening their 
monopoly positions and distorting competition, while the backbone of the economy, the small and 
medium-size enterprises (SMEs) were forced to restrictions, having little or no access to financing and 
facing a harsh business environment.  
The root-cause of the massive capital misallocation in China and of its resulting economic 
imbalances was price controls, especially the control over the fundamental prices in any economy: the 
interest rate (which was kept at low, even negative real levels for deposits, to allow a transfer of 
wealth from depositors, mainly households, to borrowers, mainly privileged state companies); the 
exchange rate (which was used as an export drive by artificially keeping the yuan undervalued); the 
price of energy and, to a certain extent, the price of land and the price of labour (wages), all of which 
helped China maintain significant competitive advantages, so that it attracted large foreign capital 
investments and it kept increasing its exports.  
Another significant weakness of the Chinese development model was (and it still is) its high 
dependence on the external demand and the resulting vulnerability of the Chinese economy to the 
external shocks, while, at the same time, the domestic demand was chronically neglected and the 
consumption  ratio  to  GDP  kept  ranking  among  the  lowest  worldwide.  The  true  weight  of  this 
vulnerability was abruptly revealed in 2008 at the outbreak of the global economic crisis, when all the 
most  important  three  markets  for  Chinese  exports  –  the  EU,  the  USA  and  Japan  –  collapsed 
simultaneously, leaving Chinese exporters without orders. This led to tens of thousands of factory 
closures, bankruptcies, a sudden and huge increase in unemployment and an abrupt contraction of 
growth, inducing the cabinet to implement a vast fiscal and investment programme, amounting to 
about 586 billion US dollars (4 trillion yuan). If not for everybody at the time, in retrospect, many 
have come to the conclusion that the short-term efficiency of this oversized intervention (mainly the 
quick return to a two-digits growth rate) was not worth its longer-term consequences, some of which 
are still unsolved. 58 
 
Thirdly, the banking system underpinning the real economy also got flawed, by granting cheap 
loans  at  political  command,  writing  off  non-performing  credit  for  SOEs  and  promoting  financial 
repression
1 through the interest rate policy. Additionally, in recent years , the official banking system 
seemed to not only overlook, but even take part in the development of “shadow banking”, a parallel, 
un-official  and  high-interest  rate  banking  system,  which  flourished  against  the  backdrop  of  the 
financing shortages encountered by the SMEs. On the whole, all these developments rendered the 
Chinese financial system itself quite vulnerable. 
Naturally, the flaws, asymmetries and imbalances developed in the Chinese economy were 
mirrored  by  the  Chinese  society,  where  social  inequality  and  the  income  gap  increased,  while 
collusion, corruption and moral hazard worsened. Furthermore, the excessive focus on quantitative 
accomplishments speeded up the inefficient use of natural resources, often using highly polluting 
technologies which took a huge toll on the environment and on the population. Also, it generated a 
geographically  imbalanced  development,  with  highly  developed  Eastern  coast  regions  on  the  one 
hand, and the central and Western regions lagging way behind, on the other.  
Globally, the model also led to significant external imbalances, prone to escalate commercial 
frictions between China and its foreign partners, particularly with the EU and the US. 
As  all  these  flaws,  imbalances  and  malfunctions  added  up  –  while  further  investments 
following the same pattern faced the prospect of diminishing returns, the “demographic dividend
2” 
kept fading away, the rising prices for factors slackened competitiveness and the economic growth 
slowed down - it became increasingly obvious that the Chinese development model has reached its 
limits and was in urgent need of change. 
3. The 4 “-uns” of the Chinese economy and the urgency of rebalancing 
The best description of what lays now beneath the surface of a seemingly spectacular economy 
was given in March 2007 by the former premier Wen Jiabao, who contended that Chinese economy 
had become “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and, ultimately, unsustainable”.  
Still, in spite of such a drastic diagnostic, not only did his cabinet do little to reform the 
economy, but on the contrary, as a result of the 4 trillion yuan fiscal and investment stimulus package, 
which it implemented between 2008 - 2010 to countervail the impact of the global economic crisis, the 
“4  –uns“  worsened  and  the  vulnerability  implied  by  them  was  increased  (Roach,  S.,  2013).  By 
implementing the stimulus package, the Chinese government reversed the downward trend of the 
                                                           
1 The term was introduced in 1973 by Stanford economists Edward S. Shaw and Ronald I. McKinon and refers 
to any of the measures that governments employ to channel funds to themselves, that, in a deregulated market, 
would go elsewhere. In this paper it refers to policies by the Chinese government to keep real deposit interest 
rates low, or even negative, and channel savings to privileged state companies by way of cheap loans from the 
state banks, given at political command. 
2  The term refers to a period of 20 or 30 years, when families have (from various reasons)  fewer younger 
dependents (in China due to the “one-child policy”) and fewer older dependents (in China due to shorter life 
expectancy  of  the  older  generations),  so  that  the  largest  segment  of  the  population  is  in  the  range  of  the 
productive working age. During this time span, the economy benefits from a large pool of labour, low wages, 
competitive advantage and economic growth. Such a demographic dividend was experienced by China in the last 
two or three decades. But, as the living standards improved, life expectancy increased and so did the number of 
dependant elders, while roughly the same number of young people entered the labour market, yearly. The result 
of these trends was a relative decrease of the working age segment of population and a “fading away of the 
demographic dividend”, which could lead further to labour shortages, increased wages and a downward pressure 
on the economic growth rate. The recent decisions to give up the one-child policy aims at reversing this trend, 
but its outcomes will be seen in decades. 59 
 
economic growth rate during the Q4/2008-Q1/2009, created a significant number of new jobs and 
managed to preserve social order but, at the same time, it triggered a host of unwanted, negative 
outcomes which aggravated previous economic imbalances and created some new ones.  
In the short run, the huge amount of money poured into the Chinese economy through the 
enormous fiscal expansion and the loose monetary policy which accompanied it, pushed prices up, 
inflated speculative bubbles in the equity and real estate markets, encouraged poor lending practices 
and  nourished  a  serious  investment  extravagance  and  waste,  resulting  in  growing  industrial 
overcapacities and unnecessary real estate and infrastructure building. At the same time, the flood of 
“easy  money”  furthered  corruption  and  collusion,  so  that  the  well-positioned  and  well-connected 
families got richer and the income gap in Chinese society got deeper.  
In the longer run, the interventionist programme of 2008-2010 led to a steep increase in the 
regional  governments’  debts,  it  entailed  a  worrisome  rise  of  the  non-performing  loans  and  it 
contributed  to  the  expansion  of  the  parallel,  unregulated  system  of  shadow  banking.  All  these 
developments made the Chinese financial system more vulnerable, worsened its structural weaknesses 
and deteriorated further the resource allocation in Chinese economy. 
The great beneficiaries of the governmental interventions were again the SOEs, mainly the 
136 “central companies” directly controlled by the government and managed by leaders appointed on 
political  grounds.  Between  2008-2010,  these  state  companies  enjoyed  an  even  more  favourable 
support  than  usually,  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  private  sector,  especially  the  SMEs,  so  that  the 
stimulus program seemed to have generated a powerful new wave of “state sector advancement while 
the private sector recedes” (Tai, C., 2009), becoming an instrument for strengthening state companies 
and crowding out the private ones (Chan, E., 2010). State monopolies reinforced their dominance in 
key sectors of the economy, such as banking, telecommunications, energy, rail transport, shipping, 
petroleum, etc. and were helped to extend their global presence, both by trade and investments, while 
in contrast, private businesses had to face financial shortages and unfair competition from SOEs.  
While the vast stimulus package implemented in the first years of the global economic crisis 
helped China cope very well with its downturn challenges, during the following years, especially in 
2011 and 2012, the government had to focus on correcting the negative “by-products” of its previous 
massive  intervention  in  the  economy,  primarily  trying  to  cool  down  inflation  and  to  defuse  the 
speculative bubbles. Besides policies such as these, which were addressing precise urgent matters but 
were not solving the multiple structural imbalances of the economy, specific measures for changing 
the development model itself were included in the 2011-2015 five-year plan (FYP). Nevertheless, in 
spite of some accomplishments, the former cabinet didn’t seem to push very forcefully for reforms, 
leaving this task to the next government, led, since 2013, by premier Li Keqiang. 
Reforming China’s development model and rebalancing its economy seems to be a complex 
three-pronged process of: 
  rebalancing demand, namely of striking the right balance between domestic consumption, 
investments  and  exports,  with  home  demand  and  domestic  consumption  playing  a  more 
important part as engines of growth, while relying less on foreign demand and exports, as well 
as on state investments; 
  restructuring supply, which includes: striking a better balance between primary, secondary 
and tertiary sectors, with a focus on accelerating the development of services; rebalancing 
traditional,  natural  resources-intensive  industries,  which  need  production  capacity 
adjustments, upgrading and repositioning in the global value chains, on the one hand, and the 60 
 
higher-technology, knowledge and innovation-intensive industries, whose development need 
to pick up speed, on the other hand; also, striking a better balance between polluting and green 
industries;  levelling  the  playing  field  for  a  fairer  competition  between  state  and  private, 
foreign and domestic companies; breaking up monopolies and any other structures or practices 
which distort markets, encouraging SMEs and private start-ups; 
  rebalancing regional development, by extending urbanization and levelling away the urban / 
rural differences in terms of incomes, opportunities and living standards; also by rebalancing 
the  development  of  the  Eastern  and  Western  regions  of  the  country  and  bridging  the 
development gap between them. 
Simultaneously, proper balances should be struck: 
  between economic growth and social stability, by setting lower growth rate targets, adjusted to 
China’s present development level and social needs, and by switching from quantitative to 
qualitative goals, higher living standards included; the state should be less of an investor in the 
economy, and more of an investor in public services development and social welfare; 
  between  human  needs  and  nature,  by  trying  to  reasonably  meet  human  needs  without 
damaging the environment, by promoting green sources of energy, green technologies and 
industries, rational and efficient resources and energy consumption, by fostering innovation 
focussed on  regaining a well-balanced environment, which is not harming human health, etc. 
  between domestic development and external relations, by adopting development strategies, 
policies and regulations which consider not harming in any way other countries, or the global 
economy as a whole. 
4. The New Season of China’s Economic Miracle 
While  the  former  Chinese  cabinet  focussed  on  economic  growth  and  quantitative 
accomplishments  showing  little  propensity  for  reforms,  the  new  government  faces  the  complex 
challenge of completely changing the economic model, so that China avoids the  “middle income 
trap”
3 and enters the highly developed economies elite. The recent positioning of China’s new leaders 
shows that they are fully aware of the urgency of this endeavour, willing to reform and take on the 
challenge of steering China to a sustainable, more temperate growth, focussed on quality.  
Premier  Li  Keqiang  acknowledged  that  Chinese  economy  is  at  a  crucial  stage  of  its 
transformation, it is steadily moving forward and its fundamentals are sound. He has also affirmed that 
his  cabinet  has  a  holistic  approach  in  conducting  readjustments  and  reforms  that  “Reform  and 
innovation is the running theme and spirit of the policies adopted by the Chinese government, and it is 
the banner that we will always hold high.”
4 and that “Now the new season of the Chinese economic 
                                                           
3  The middle  income  trap is  an economic  development situation,  where  a  country  which  attains  a  certain 
income (due to given advantages) will get stuck at that level. As wages rise, manufacturers often find themselves 
unable to compete in export markets with lower-cost producers elsewhere. Yet, they still find themselves behind 
the advanced economies in higher-value products. This is the middle-income trap, which saw many countries 
languish for decades in what the World Bank call the “middle income” range (about $1,000 to $12,000 gross 
national income per person measured in 2010 money). Typically, countries trapped at middle-income level have: 
(1) low investment ratios; (2) slow manufacturing growth; (3) limited industrial diversification; and (4) poor 
labour market conditions. The problem usually arises when developing economies find themselves stuck in the 
middle, with rising wages and declining cost competitiveness, unable to compete with advanced economies in 
high-skill innovations, or with low income, low wage economies in the cheap production of manufactured goods. 
(Wikipedia, March, 2014); 
4  Premier Li Keqiang's Speech at the Summer Davos Forum opening ceremony , the Annual Meeting of the 
New Champions 2013 , Dalian, September the 11
th, 2013; 61 
 
miracle,  one  of  better quality  and  higher  efficiency,  is  unveiled, and  I  guarantee you  even  more 
exciting stories to come.” 
5  
Some of these pledges were substantiated at the 3
rd Plenary Session of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) Central Committee (CC) in November 2013, where China’s new top decision makers 
unveiled  the  economic  reform  blueprint  for  the  next  decade.  On  this  occasion,  balancing  the 
relationship between state and market - with the market playing the decisive role in allocation and the 
state intervening less, but more efficiently - was claimed to be the key idea and aim of the reform 
process. According to this blueprint, China was going to stick to the Party’s leadership and to its 
socialist road, therefore no political reforms were intended, but a strong signal in favour of deep and 
comprehensive economic reforms was given. It was contended that “reform and opening-up” will 
decide the destiny of modern China and its adjustment to a rapidly changing global world. 
In terms of market reforms, the commitment for fair, open and transparent market rules so that 
prices were decided by markets, was stressed upon; state control over economic sectors was going to 
gradually  loosen,  to  the  benefit  of  the  private  sector  and  foreign  enterprises;  companies  were  to 
operate  independently  and  to  compete  fairly,  in  a  modern  market  system;  the  SOEs  were  to  be 
reformed,  monopolies were to be broken and competition introduced; more state-owned sectors were 
to  be  opened  to  the  private  capital,  including  finance,  telecommunications  and  railways;  market 
barriers were to be cleared to improve efficiency and fairness in resource allocation; the fiscal reform 
was going to be in special focus, with a view to building a modern, transparent and efficient fiscal 
system, with improved legislation; SOEs were to have their profits taxed more substantially (with tax 
increases  going  from  0-15%  at  present,  to  30%,  by  2020)  and  the  resulting  funds  were  to  be 
redistributed for social purposes; internal and external openness were going to be promoted by both 
“going global” and attracting foreign direct investments (FDI) policies; reforms and the new opening 
up policies were to be tested in free trade zones (FTZ),  used as pilot areas for reform.  
The Session also put forward land reform, with issues such as establishing property rights to 
farmers, the reform of the hukou system
6 of registration, the need for a unified land market between 
urban and rural areas and for new urban/rural relations. These reforms were to be complemented by 
the reform of the local administrations, aiming at streamlining the local/central revenue division and at 
allowing local governments diversify their budgetary sources by issuance of bonds.  
Hugely important and urgent, the financial reform was going to introduce the interest rate and 
exchange rate liberalization, to allow the access of foreign and local private banks into the Chinese 
banking system and to regulate shadow banking.  
                                                           
5 Idem. 
6 A hukou is a record in the system of household registration required by Chinese law. In 1958, the Chinese 
government officially promulgated the family register system to control the movement of people between urban 
and rural areas. Individuals were broadly categorised as a "rural" or "urban" worker. A worker seeking to move 
from the country to urban areas to take up non-agricultural work would have to apply through the relevant 
bureaucracies. The number of workers allowed to make such moves was tightly controlled. People who worked 
outside their authorized domain or geographical area would not qualify for grain rations, employer-provided 
housing, education for children or health care. Hukou limited mass migration from the land to the cities to ensure 
some structural stability. By regulating labour, it ensured an adequate supply of low cost workers to the plethora 
of state owned businesses. At present, it is a system widely regarded as unfair, but there is also fear that its 
liberalization  would lead to  massive  movement of people into the cities, causing  strain to city government 
services, damage to the rural economies, and increase in social unrest and crime. (Wikipedia, March, 2014); 62 
 
The research and innovation reform, encompassing - among other issues - a special concern 
for green technologies development and better environment protection, was also earmarked as one of 
the major objectives of the next decade.  
Also, for a more equitable distribution of the benefits of development, reforms in social affairs 
and education had to be accelerated in order to set up a reasonable income distribution system and to 
increase  domestic  consumption.  Further  detailed  reforms  will  follow.  They  will  be  designed  by 
numerous think tanks and masterminded by a central leading team in charge with the general design of 
the reform. 
5. Challenging old vested interests  
The reform blueprint briefly presented above is unprecedented in scope and intensity and 
therefore widely considered the starting point of the greatest economic rethink since Deng Xiaoping. 
Putting it together was a big step forward, but many further challenges are to be faced in its run-down 
and, most of all, in its implementation. To our judgement, fulfilling the deep and comprehensive 
reform needed and intended in China will be a difficult, long and bumpy road, due to powerful vested 
interests which will surely oppose change and fight back, trying to preserve a profitable status quo.  
Just looking briefly at some of the major reform directions envisaged, one can figure out the most 
obvious opposing forces that might come to the fore.  
On the subject of reforming SOEs, for instance, the opposition might be huge among the party 
elites, as these companies are controlled by powerful, politically high-positioned families, who have 
got very rich and won’t give up easily their sources of wealth. Also, by opening the state-owned 
sectors  to  the  private  capital  it  can  be  expected  that  the  members  of  the  ruling  elite  who  have 
benefited directly and hugely from a state-dominated economy will oppose once more, as market-
oriented reforms directed to levelling up the competitive playing field would hurt their interests and 
diminish their privileges. At the same time, SOEs themselves will oppose to losing their subsidies and 
privileges, as well as to becoming more accountable, paying taxes, giving up dividends and facing 
competition under free market conditions. 
The financial reform will most probably meet the opposition of the state banks themselves, as 
they will not happily agree to losing their monopoly positions and meet, instead, strong competition 
from potent foreign private banks. Nor will they easily accept to lose the protection and support they 
previously enjoyed, having to deal, by themselves, with piling-up non-performing loans. One could 
even speculate that, used to act on political command, under the protection of the state and of their 
monopoly positions, these banks might even lack the practice and boldness required when having to 
survive in a harsh, competitive environment, forced to make risky decisions on economic, not political 
grounds. Additionally, one could expect that some opposition to the financial reforms will come even 
from part of the academics, who will warn on the risks of economic crises, following interest rate 
liberalization and other measures. 
Finally, many could also be reticent to land reform and to the reform of the hukou system of 
registration. The first to oppose to land reform are expected to be the local authorities, who not only 
financed local budgets by selling land, but also did this as a profitable business and source of richness 
for themselves. Clear property rights for farmers and a unified land market generating correct prices 
would deprive these local leaders of an important source of wealth and power. As to the hukou system 
reform, giving it up will meet both the opposition of the local governments and of the city dwellers, 63 
 
because this measure is prone to induce a huge pressure on the already overcrowded and difficult to 
manage Chinese cities. 
6. Conclusions 
At a crucial stage of its transformation, China embarks on a comprehensive, long and difficult 
reform path, which is both needed and inevitable. The set of reforms envisioned by its new leaders is 
the greatest economic rethink since Deng Xiaoping, meant to rebalance Chinese economy and regain 
the sustainability of its economic growth, while avoiding the risk of getting the economy stuck in the 
middle income trap.  
This is a complex, difficult and risky endeavour, which will be hard to design and put together 
in every detail considering all the multiple inter-correlations, implications and influences between its 
components, but it will be even harder to implement, given the expected strong opposition of vested 
interests. Thus, the reform implementation will be the touch stone of the new Chinese leaders, while 
the reform itself and the radical changes it provides for will be a challenging test for the Chinese 
economy and society. Still, for China this is the only way forward and, considering its position and 
impact on the global stage, all its moves, its successes or failures, are of utmost importance for all the 
rest of the world. 
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